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Abstract 
 
The separation between firms’ ownership and control represents one of the major 
challenges of corporate finance studies due to its ability to, on one hand reduce (through 
firms’ agency costs) and on the other hand increase firms’ value (through a more 
professional management). Variable remuneration has been pointed as one of the most 
effective ways of reducing agency costs (without reducing value created, at least at 
some extent of reducing agency costs, to shareholders) and therefore, it is 
unsurprisingly we observed an increasing weight of variable remuneration on the total 
management compensation. This dissertation, focusing on CEOs’ stock option 
compensation and using S&P 500 data for the period from 2013 to 2015, aims to 
examine whether the specificities of this particular type of compensation can contribute 
to a set of managerial opportunism behaviours that may influence corporate dividend 
policies, leverage ratios and investment decisions. 
For a final sample of 314 firms, split into 230 growth and 84 non-growth firms, our 
results confirm the idea of managerial opportunism in the definition of the amounts of 
dividends distributed, stock repurchases, leverage ratios and investment decisions 
although not always generalized and varying across industries and firms’ size.  
 
 
 
 
Key-words: Agency costs; Corporate Governance; Compensation; Executive stock 
options; Corporate policies  
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Resumo 
 
A separação entre a propriedade das empresas e as funções de gestão das mesmas 
representa um dos maiores motivos de estudo das finanças empresariais uma vez que 
esta separação é, por um lado, capaz de reduzir e por outro, criar ainda mais custos de 
agência. Nesse sentido, a remuneração variável e por objectivos tem vido a apresentar 
uma importância crescente já que é considerada como uma forma eficaz de reduzir as 
divergências entre gestores e accionistas. Assim, este estudo foca-se especificamente na 
remuneração dos CEOs através da atribuição de opções de compra de acções da própria 
empresa, remuneração esta que revela desde já um peso bastante relevante nos EUA e 
que, dadas as suas especificidades, pode ter como consequências a alteração das 
políticas de dividendos, endividamento e investimento por forma a maximizar os 
interesses e a remuneração da gestão. 
Para a realização deste estudo empírico, foram analisadas 314 empresas do índice S&P 
500 no período de 2013 a 2015, tendo estas sido posteriormente divididas em 230 
empresas com oportunidades de crescimento e 84 empresas em fase estável do seu ciclo 
de vida. Os resultados sugerem que, de facto, a remuneração através de opções de 
compra de acções da própria empresa tem impacto nas políticas de dividendos e de 
recompra de acções, assim como na definição dos rácios de endividamento e das 
políticas de investimento das empresas, embora os resultados variem de acordo com a 
dimensão e a indústria em que estas se inserem.  
  
 
 
 
 
Palavras-chave: Custos de agência; Governo corporativo; Remuneração; Opções de 
compra de acções; Política corporativa  
 
Códigos JEL: G32, G35, J33, M12, M52  
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1. Introduction 
 
Executive remuneration, in all its forms, has been a ‘hot topic’ over the last decades and 
the motivation for several studies. The constant challenges regarding globalization, 
open markets and economic and financial crisis demand firms to have highly qualified 
and experienced leaders whereby most relevant decisions pass through. Hereupon, to 
attract and lock-in key personnel (Lee et al., 2008), remunerate high responsibilities and 
align interests reducing agency costs (Hall and Liebman, 1998), executive pay has 
hugely increased last decades (Sapp, 2008) mainly caused by pay-for-performance 
measures which are pointed as an efficient solution for these agency costs. Namely, a 
substantial body of literature seem to suggest that stock option compensation can be “a 
financial incentive to make the stock go up once the CEO may become extremely 
wealthy in that case” (Angel and McCabe, 2008, p.227). 
The problem however of tying managerial compensation to firms’ performance may lie 
on managerial opportunism and all the schemes that can be created by executives to see 
their wealth increased independently of the harm that can be caused in the overall firm. 
In accordance with this line of thinking, Fenn and Liang (2001) proved the existence of 
a negative effect of stock option compensation on firms’ dividend yield, Ryan and 
Wiggins (2001) and Ortiz-Molina (2007) documented a change of CEOs’ debt 
preferences when they are awarded with stock options and Carpenter (2000) stated that 
stock options may be a way of influencing managers’ risk appetite regarding investment 
decisions. 
Once stock option compensation is a developed practice in the US only, this is the 
market where this study will be focused on. Thus, recurring to S&P 500 firms, for the 
period from 2013 to 2015 and looking to explore differences across growth and non-
growth industries as well as across small, medium and large firms, this study intends to 
examine the veracity of the arguments about CEOs’ stock option compensation 
influence on corporate decisions. 
For a final sample of 314 firms (230 growth and 84 non-growth firms), our estimations 
unveiled that, although varying across industries and firms’ size, stock option 
compensation in fact has a role in the definition of the amount of dividends distributed 
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and stocks repurchased as well as in the leverage ratios and in investment policies of 
firms, which confirms the hypothesized idea of managerial opportunism.  
With this study, we intend to take a step forward in the definition of an optimal 
compensation package for managers, capable of aligning their interests with 
shareholders’ ones. 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an exhaustive 
review of the literature about this subject. Section 3 describes the methodology and data 
used to perform the study while Section 4 presents the results and main findings of the 
estimations. Finally, in section 5 a resume, the main conclusions and suggestions for 
further studies are provided. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
2.1 The effect of pay-for-performance measures on firms 
There is a growing literature sustaining the idea that executives’ remuneration and 
firms’ performance are side by side. Murphy (1985) collected eighteen years of data of 
publicly held firms and concluded that there is in fact a positive correlation between 
executive compensation and firm’s performance measured by the growth of sales and 
shareholders return. 
In the overall research on the theme, the pointed problem seems not to be related with 
high wages but instead on how those payments are done and all the implications they 
bring to companies. To attract and encourage CEOs and remaining executives to engage 
and develop firms, we passed from an era where fixed salaries dominated, to an era 
where variable remuneration in the form of bonus, equity, stock options, pension plans 
and perquisites seem to represent a significant part of compensation plans. The motives 
are particularly well explained by Angel and McCabe (2008, p.227): “If the 
shareholders want the value of the stock to go up, then giving the CEO a financial 
incentive to make the stock go up is one of the best ways of achieving that goal. By 
giving the CEO a large number of stock options, the CEO may become extremely 
wealthy if the share price rises. If the stock price does not rise at all, then the CEO gets 
nothing from the options.” 
The main questions, the ones leading to this study, are then “how far are managers 
willing to go to see their wealth increased and how do they act to achieve so?”. 
In this context, there is a substantial body of literature showing that pay-for-
performance measures can be attractive and engage executives with shareholders 
expectations. However, these metrics impact and can be influenced by a several number 
of variables as corporate governance, board composition, consultants, accountings and 
even investment decisions and firms’ capital structure. Towards Board Composition and 
CEOs’ compensation, several authors have put their efforts to unmask it. Core et al. 
(1999) found out that executives’ remuneration tends to be higher when CEO is also 
Chairman, when Board is broader and when outside directors are nominated by CEOs, 
which seems logical and is also in accordance with Wade et al. (1990). Bebchuk and 
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Fried (2003) found similar outcomes but additionally documented that higher payments 
to CEOs are a result of antitakeover policies and inexistence (or in a few number) of 
large and institutional shareholders. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) defend that 
compensation and the existence of large shareholders have an inverse relation due to a 
higher control over executives’ decisions. Consultants are a target of scrutiny too since, 
and citing Bebchuk and Fried (2003, p.78): “(…) consultants are often used to justify 
executive pay rather than to optimize it”, once they are usually hired by the top 
executives that benefit from high compensation packages. Finally, Burns and Kedia 
(2006) disclosed that payments through options over firm’s stocks incite CEOs to 
manage accruals and other accounts to boost their personal wealth.  
 
 
2.2 The case of Executive Stock Options 
Stock options represent a very particular case, one that may be very effective aligning 
both shareholders and managers interests whenever managers behave ethically. By 
granting stock options to executives, the Board of Directors is allowing them to buy, at 
a certain future date, part of the firm’s equity at a predetermined price (the exercise or 
strike price). 
To better understand further implications and concepts, it is important to comprehend 
how stock options are valued and which variables influence their value the most. 
According to Black and Scholes (1973)’s model applied to dividend paying stocks 
(presented in equations 2.1 to 2.3) the variables that influence the option value are 
presented in Table 1. 
 
2.1      𝑐 = (𝑆 − 𝐷) ∗ 𝑒−𝑞∗𝑇 ∗ 𝑁(𝑑1) − 𝐾𝑒−𝑟∗𝑇 ∗ 𝑁(𝑑2) 
 
2.2      𝑑1 =  
ln(
𝑆−𝐷
𝐾
)+(𝑟+
𝜎2
2
)∗𝑇
𝜎∗ √𝑇
 
 
2.3    𝑑2 = 𝑑1 −  𝜎 ∗ √𝑇 
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Table 1: Variables’ effect on European call option price 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to Table 1, current stock price, time to maturity, volatility and risk-free rate 
all have a positive impact on the value of the call as the higher these variables, the 
higher the probability of the option to be in-the-money and therefore, to be exercised on 
maturity date. The opposite happens with the strike price and dividends. Given this, it is 
now easier to realize that executives’ wealth will be greater as higher is the stock price 
since they will buy for ‘K’ something that is worth ‘S’ (in case S > K, otherwise call 
will not be exercised). 
Problems, however, arise when, as described by Dong et al. (2010), managers with 
significant amounts of stock option start having “myopic” conducts, harming that way 
shareholders’ wealth. As reported by Hall and Murphy (2003), the value of stock 
options conceded to employees of S&P 500 achieved a value of approximately $120 
billion in the year of 2000, which is, for example, more than the Portuguese GDP in that 
same year ($118.4 billion), according to World Bank (2016). Also, and according to 
Forbes (1998)
1
, in 1998 stock options accounted for approximately forty percent of 
executives’ total compensation. These numbers allow us to take (at least) three 
conclusions: 1) how stock options and managerial ownership were a trend at date; 2) the 
impact it may have on firms (if stocks are exercised) due to the magnitude of the 
                                                          
1
 Forbes (1998) “Who gets paid what” 
 
Variable Effect on an European Call 
Stock current value + 
Exercise price - 
Time to maturity + 
Stock volatility + 
Risk-free rate + 
Discounted value 
of a future dividend 
- 
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numbers; 3) how relevant stock options are for managers and for their personal wealth. 
All the three considerations are important, but one should not underestimate human 
behaviour when it comes to their personal wealth. Needless to say, managers will tend 
to take riskier decisions in the name of firms since options eliminate their downside risk 
but allow unlimited gains (Sitkin and Pablo, 1992; Sanders, 2001). 
As the volatility of the firm positively affects the value of the calls, managers seem to 
seek risky decisions in several different ways like choosing positive NPV projects with 
higher risks, increasing debt, reducing the use of derivatives, between many others, 
counteracting frequently shareholders’ preferences and creating new agency problems. 
In an empirical study, however, Cohen (2000) determined no large harm done to 
shareholders regarding the increasing risk-taking behaviours of executives. Later, Knopf 
et al. (2002) added that higher amounts of options on managers’ personal portfolios, 
will produce a decrease in the amounts spent by companies on hedging instruments. 
Subject of study has also been the timing of information disclosure by executives. Once 
stock options have expiration date (frequently called vesting date), which is likely to be 
the most important date for option holders, administrators have incentives to manage the 
release of good and bad news so that it is ensured that their options will be in the money 
at that time. Such was documented by Aboody and Kasznik (2000) and Chauvin and 
Shenoy (2001) that state that due to the privileged information, executives tend to 
announce bad news before annual meetings where stock options are awarded, in order 
to push down the exercise price, and good news after the granting date, so that the 
probability of the options to be exercised increases. Consistent with this hypothesis, 
Yermack (1997) made an empirical analysis with a sample of 620 option grants to 
executives of Fortune 500 and observed an average cumulative abnormal return of 
approximately 2 percent in the fifty trading days after the options have been attributed. 
In sum, so far it was showed how executive stock options influence general 
management decisions. Further review will focus on its impact on dividend policy, 
financing and investment decisions. 
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2.2.1 Executive stock options and dividend policies 
 
Dividend policy is one of the major puzzles of modern finance and thus target of 
numerous researches. Regardless of this, no consensus seems to be reached about the 
subject due to the several pros and cons associated to its payment. Despite this fact, 
many reasons have been pointed all over the years to explain why firms keep paying 
dividends. 
As first suggested by Miller and Modigliani (1961), one of the reasons to pay dividends 
is related with the clientele effect. The main argument of this theory resides on the 
premise that the payment of dividends will attract investors who privilege the receipt of 
“certain” income over time instead of waiting for capital gains (that may take a lot of 
time or never occur even). Miller and Rock (1985) defined a signalling theory, where 
managers pay dividends as a way of sending markets some information about firms’ 
current and future condition. Later, Jensen (1986) and Chang (1993), stated that 
dividends are a way to (moderately) decapitalize firms and reduce agency costs so that 
managers are not allowed to act carelessly and invest in negative or risky NVP projects 
that can be undesirable for stockholders. Notwithstanding this, recent studies, as the 
ones provided by DeAngelo et al. (2006) and Denis and Osobov (2008) identified firms’ 
profitability, growth opportunities, size and retained results as the most relevant 
variables explaining dividend distribution (or lack of it). 
Nonetheless and at the same time dividend distribution was focus of study, another 
trend was arising in the markets: the repurchase of stocks as a way to remunerate 
shareholders. Generally speaking, these operations are simply a way for firms to acquire 
some of their outstanding shares on the market which can be done in a private 
placement or for the general public owning firms’ shares. 
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Figure 1: Stock repurchases in the U.S. from 1981 to 2015 
 
 
 
As documented by Cudd et al. (1996), repurchases take place mainly when stocks are 
undervalued by the market or for signalling or controlling reasons (by reducing the 
number of shares outstanding and the number of shareholders, managers’ behaviour will 
be less scrutinized and their power will increase). On the other hand, some other authors 
define more opportunistic reasons for those buyback operations: Kahle (2002) defines 
EPS ratio as a significant motivation, while Lambert et al. (1989) and Lamba and 
Miranda (2010) stated managerial stock options as a major cause for it. From the 
perspective of EPS, the sense lies on the fact that some investors (mainly individual 
investors with lack of financial knowledge) recklessly make comparisons of EPS ratios 
between firms before investing. The problem lies on the fact that high EPS may be a 
product of good operational and financial results or solely an effect of the decrease of 
the number outstanding shares. On the other hand the hypothesis presented by Lambert 
et al. (1989) and Lamba and Miranda (2010) evidences the fact that dividends make 
stock price fall, which does not happens with repurchases. Hereupon, executives with 
stock options will show a preference for these operations because they will not observe 
a decrease in their wealth. Moreover, in the same study, authors concluded that the 
source: Compustat, Aswarth Damodaran 
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higher the amount of stock options possessed by executives, the more likely it is that the 
firm will do a large repurchase of stocks in the future. 
Aside managerial opportunistic behaviours, Jagannathan et al. (2000) determined that 
an increase in dividends occur after firms’ good performances and buybacks, by its 
time, after poor performances, which is fair (at least theoretically) since increasing 
dividends after bad performances would make stock prices fall even more, which in 
some cases could be dramatic. In addition, repurchases grant managers some flexibility 
once they are made sporadically whereas a dividend cut can be misunderstood by the 
markets. Although buyback operations have observed a tremendous increase of 
popularity last decades, literature seems to be consensual when stating that they are not 
substituting but instead complementing dividend payments. 
Fenn and Liang (2001) empirically showed that “a one standard deviation change in 
management stock option variable reduces dividend yields by an economically 
significant 38 basis points”. 
Later, Short et al. (2002) measured a significant positive relation between the existence 
of institutional shareholdings and dividend payout, which is mainly due to the higher 
monitoring practiced by these shareholders. 
Cuny et al. (2009) found evidence proving that managers use stock repurchases to offset 
the reduction of the EPS ratio, which are caused by the exercise of executive stock 
options. 
Perceiving opportunistic actions carried out by managers, shareholders were in need of 
finding ways to protect their interests. As such, in the later eighties, scholars introduced 
the concept of “dividend protected stock options”. More specifically, these particular 
options ensure that the amount of dividends distributed is not determined (or at least 
affected) by the managers’ wealth in the form of stock options. Dividend protected 
options will act adjusting the exercise price of executive stock options to the amount of 
dividends paid. Consistent with this, Lambert et al. (1989) stated that the amount of 
dividends is inversely related to the amount of executive stock options granted since 
these options are not dividend protected. White (1996) supports the idea that companies 
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start associating executives’ variable compensation to dividend payments in order to 
reduce agency costs between managers and shareholders. 
In the same line of thinking of the previous studies, recently, Burns et al. (2015) 
acknowledged that payout ratios increase when executive stock options are dividend 
protected and that this kind of shareholders defence is more commonly used in Europe 
than in the US. 
In sum, the solution for this puzzle may lie on the use of dividend protected stock 
options. However and since this is not yet a common practice, the negotiation of 
managers’ compensation packages must be carried out by the board of directors 
directly, instead of external consultants, contrarily to what is said by Geiler and 
Renneboog (2016). 
 
 
2.2.2 Executive stock options and corporate financing decisions 
 
“Executive pay is incorporated into Moody’s credit analysis of rated issuers because 
compensation is a determinant of management behaviour that affects indirectly credit 
quality”, in Moody’s Investor Service, Special Comment, 2007. 
 
Theory over the last decades has recognized the motives that can explain the capital 
structure differences between firms. When in need of capital, firms recur to own or 
external financing namely retaining results, doing IPO’s/SEO’s or simply issuing bonds 
or even hybrid instruments. No consensus, however, seems to be achieved about the 
motives that lead managers to choose one financing method instead of another. 
The debate was first introduced by Modigliani and Miller (1958)’s capital structure 
irrelevance theory where authors defend that, in the absence of market frictions, the way 
firms get financing does not impact their valuation. However, not only markets are not 
perfect as also there are many other theories pointed to explain capital structure 
decisions across firms. Despite the lack of agreement about financing preferences, it 
seems clear that decisions are taken by managers according to the different benefits and 
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costs (not only for firms but for managers’ personal interests too) of each financing 
method. 
The most commonly shared theory is that managers define capital structure in a way 
that can maximize shareholders return, which usually is achieved pursuing a minimum 
weighted average cost of capital. Though it can be a fair point and some managers may 
in fact act in the benefit of shareholders, major part of literature point different 
motivations this puzzle: trade-off theory by Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), pecking 
order theory by Myers (1984), agency theories (Jensen (1986)) and management 
compensation theories as the one pointed by Smith and Watts (1982), between others. 
Donaldson (1963) and Grossman and Hart (1982) sustain that managers avoid recurring 
to external financing since it increases the monitoring over their decisions, significantly 
reducing this way the consumptions of perquisites as also detailed by Myers: “managers 
avoid relying on external finance because it would subject them to the discipline of the 
capital market”. 
In accordance with the above described, Pinegar and Wilbricht (1989) conducted a 
survey to CEOs so that empirical results could confirm the theories of all the academic 
studies about pecking order. His findings evidence clear trends and determined 
managers’ preferences as follows: 1) retained results, 2) straight debt, 3) convertible 
debt, 4) external common equity, 5) straight preferred stock and 6) convertible preferred 
stock. 
Agha (2011) makes references on the concept of suboptimal leverage, where managers 
set leverage below the optimal levels to prevent from future financial distress situations 
and to be capable of accepting investment opportunities that may arise. The author 
recognizes that to mitigate these lower levels of debt (suboptimal) managers are offered 
stock options to increase their “appetite” for risk. However, at the same time, higher 
monitoring governance strategies must be implemented so that managers’ risk 
behaviour does not become unsustainable and harmful for firms. 
But if compensation through stock options reduces agency costs between managers and 
shareholders, on the other hand it increases the conflicts between shareholders and 
bondholders, transferring wealth from one to another. Under this view, an empirical 
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study conducted by DeFusco et al. (1990) found a cumulative abnormal return (from 
here on denoted by CAR) of common stocks of 0.68% in the two days after the 
announcement of the attribution of stock options to executives. In contrast, a negative 
CAR of -0.14% was found for bondholders for the same period. 
The fact that this theme is target of several studies ends up benefiting bondholders 
which can better understand executives’ behaviour and find ways to protect their 
interests. Consistent with this, Rajan and Winton (1995) found that when lenders have 
the right to renegotiate contracts or when debt is collateralized or asset-backed, 
borrowers do not have incentives to proceed with excessive risk-taking investments. 
Another key feature in leverage analysis is the effect of the variables on credit ratings 
due to the role ratings have on determining the rate at which firms can get financing and 
consequently their credibility towards the markets. As such, Lee (2008) provided two 
major conclusions: 1) the exercise of executive stock options has a positive impact on 
firms’ ratings due to the proceeds of the operations; 2) executive stock options that may 
one way or another signal future stock buybacks have a negative effect on the credit 
quality mainly because it evidences future decapitalization of the firm. 
Datta et al. (2005) suggest that stock ownership plays an important role in financing 
decisions while Choe (2003), introducing the idea of executive options with adjustable 
strike price, suggest that when the size of the options awarded is fixed, the strike price 
must be put a bit high so that managers have incentives to accept risky projects. On the 
other hand strike price must be decreased with leverage for the motives already 
described. 
Overall, it seems clear that managerial compensation can impact firms’ leverage ratios, 
so closer monitoring mechanisms must be implemented to ensure that firm’s best 
interest is tracked. 
 
 
2.2.3 Executive stock options and corporate investment decisions  
 
All other things equal and assuming a perfect world, management decisions about 
firm’s investments is usually defined according to its net present value (NPV from here 
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on). Although other methods of valuating a project are known (as the payback period, 
real options, and the internal rate of return), literature recognizes NPV as the most 
efficient way of determining if a project must or not be implemented by firms. The 
picture changes, however, when we take into consideration the fact that, as previously 
explained, managers’ interests often differ from shareholders’ ones and so is the criteria 
that defines which project will be implemented by the firm. 
At a first glance, and taking into attention the Black and Scholes model, executives that 
are remunerated with stock options exhibit a preference for risky projects since it 
increases the volatility of the firm as a whole and, consequently, increases the 
probability of their options to be in the money at maturity. This line of thinking was 
defended by Larcker (1983), Agrawal and Mandelker (1987) and Carpenter (2000). 
Further studies, however, showed that these decisions depend on several other variables. 
In contrast with the abovementioned, Gaver and Gaver (1993) explain that managers’ 
procedures can be exactly the opposite and their main argument is based on the fact that 
managers may be looking for low risk projects once they perceive the (total, non-
diversify) risk they are incurring and instead of trying to achieve higher payoffs they 
might look to protect their “certain” (current) payoffs. This findings are consistent with 
Carpenter (2000), who states that stock options may be a way of reducing risk appetite 
of managers, depending on their “risk aversion profile and the moneyness of the 
option”. In the same study, the author argues that granting deep in the money long-term 
stock options to CEOs can be a way of reducing risk-taking decisions once executives 
will probably prefer to keep the level of risk not to put in cause their current gains.  
Several theories have also pointed time horizons and CEOs’ age as variables that can 
induce certain investment decisions. Though Bolton et al. (2006), Gopalan et al. (2010) 
and Edmans et al. (2012) find benefits in long-vesting stock option grants, many other 
reviews defend the efficiency of short-vesting stock options or even a mix of both. As 
first reported by Bizjak et al. (1993) and later confirmed by Volker Laux (2012), when 
managers are granted stock options with large maturities they can either be induced to 
underinvest or overinvest today. On one hand, managers may decide not to increase 
capital expenditures or R&D expenses because the results of such investments may not 
be felt in their tenure or due to the likelihood of a takeover to happen. However, when 
this is not the case, they can, by opposition, increase the volatility of the firm in the 
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short-term by accepting risky projects, ensuring this way that their options will be in the 
money at the vesting date. Executive’s age has also been proved to be relevant in the 
firm perspective. Ryan and Wiggins (2002) suggest that young managers which are 
building their reputation on the financial world look for short-term results, putting apart 
long-term investments. In the same direction but for different reasons, old managers 
(that will sooner or later retire) are not much worried about long-term investments, as it 
is easy to understand. Therefore, they report a “quadratic” relation between CEO’s age 
and R&D expenses. Zona (2016) achieves a similar conclusion although pointing 
different motivations. According to his review, young managers do not invest much due 
to their lack of experience and knowledge about the firm and due to the complexity of 
R&D investment decisions. Old managers, by their time, present poor values in terms of 
R&D investment mainly because it affects today’s results and only later will have 
positive impact on the firm performance, probably in other’s tenure. 
In a more general approach, Sheikh (2012) showed that pay-for-performance measures 
positively impact the investment in R&D and the number of patents registered and Laux 
(2015) concluded that stock options promote innovation once they can increase the 
payoffs of these options in case of success, leading then to new business ideas, while 
Fich and Shivdasani (2005) documented a positive relation between stock options 
granted to directors and the amounts invested by firms. 
There is also substantial literature (Smith and Watts, 1992; Gaver and Gaver, 1993; 
Ryan and Wiggins, 2002; Yu, 2007) suggesting that firms facing more growth 
opportunities tend to have lower levels of debt and high use of stock options to 
remunerate executives. 
As expected, theory and its interpretation varies a lot on this subject too. Although no 
consensus exists, authors seem to agree that stock options are often an instrument that 
can help shareholders inducing executives to act in a certain way. Nonetheless and to 
summarize, stock options granted to executives should have a mix between short and 
long-term vesting dates, be accompanied by restricted stocks and by a constant 
monitoring of executives’ actions so that opportunistic behaviours are avoided. 
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3. Methodology and data 
 
 
This study aims to identify CEOs’ opportunistic behaviours and the impact they have on 
firms’ corporate decisions. Namely, the hypothesis to be tested in here is whether 
CEOs’ stock options compensation affects dividend distribution and financing and 
investment corporate decisions. This chapter provides a detailed description of the 
process that leads to our final sample, the descriptive statistics of the variables and the 
methodology applied in the study. 
 
 
3.1 Methodology 
In order to test the impact of compensation in corporate decisions about dividends, 
financing and investment, we specify three models having as dependent variables these 
three dimensions. The ‘compensation’ variable will appear as one of the regressors in 
all three specifications. Our reasoning is based on the assumption that stock options are 
valued according to the Black and Scholes (1973) model. 
Because only three years of data are available and, in a so short period of time, not 
much is expected to change, regressions will include average values of t-1 and t-2 of all 
quantitative independent variables. Potential endogeneity problems are dealt with in this 
way, given that the independent variables’ lagged values are exogenous by nature.  
To reduce the effect of extreme values (outliers) and avoid distorted results, data was 
winsorized at 2.5%, setting data below the 2.5
th
 percentile to the 2.5
th
 percentile and 
data above the 97.5
th
 percentile to the 97.5
th
 percentile. This process, when compared to 
a trimming process, not only provides more robust results as also allows us to keep all 
the observations. 
To prevent from possible heteroscedasticy and autocorrelation problems in the error 
terms, all regressions will be performed with the Newey-West estimators. The models 
are then defined as follows: 
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3.1.1 The dividends models 
Equation 3.1 measures the impact on dividend yield (DY) of the percentage of CEOs’ 
compensation that is paid in the form of stock options (SOTO) while equation 3.2 
measures the impact on repurchase yield (RY). 
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In both cases, the impact in DY and RY is controlled by the return on assets (ROA), the 
company size (proxy by the log of total assets), the monitoring (proxy by shareholders’ 
dispersion) and the number of board meetings (BM). Differences across growth and 
non-growth industries as well as structural breaks are explored by the dummy industry. 
 
3.1.2 The financing model: 
Equation 3.3 measures the impact on leverage (LV) of the percentage of CEOs’ 
compensation that is paid in the form of stock options. 
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The impact is controlled by the company size (proxy by the log of total assets), the 
effective tax rate, the monitoring (proxy by shareholders’ dispersion) and the number of 
board meetings (BM). Once again, differences across growth and non-growth industries 
as well as structural breaks are explored by the dummy industry. 
 
3.1.3 The investment model: 
Finally, equation 3.4 measures the impact on investment (CPX) of the percentage of 
CEOs’ compensation that is paid in the form of stock options (SOTO). 
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 (3.4) 
The impact is controlled by the company size (proxy by the log of total assets), the 
Tobin-q, monitoring (proxy by shareholders’ dispersion), the number of board meetings 
and the CEO’s age. Differences across growth and non-growth industries as well as 
structural breaks are explored by the dummy industry. 
 
3.1.4 Dependent variables 
 
Dividends (DY and RY) 
Once the value of an option decreases when the price of the underlying asset drops, 
managers that are granted options over firm’s stocks may be tempted to avoid dividends 
distribution since it decreases the ex-post stock price and thus reduces the option value. 
By opposition, stock repurchases does not decrease the value of the options granted to 
CEOs as the number of shares outstanding of the firm also decrease. Thereby, two 
regressions will be conducted: one with dividend yield and one for stocks repurchased, 
which is also presented in the form of a yield (from here on repurchase yield). It is 
expected that stock options payment negatively (positively) affects dividend distribution 
(stock repurchases). 
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Leverage (LV) 
In the perspective of stock option holders, a higher amount of debt can increase the 
likelihood of the option to be in-the-money due to the increase of firm’s risk and so the 
option value increases. Logically, this reasoning is only valid until a certain limit, 
otherwise firms would get into financial distress and therefore, stock options will be 
worth zero. Leverage will be measured by the debt-to-equity ratio, being equity 
measured at market values. Thus, this ratio is determined dividing total debt by market 
capitalization. 
 
CAPEX (CPX) 
In theory, and for similar reasons as the ones pointed for leverage, CEOs with 
significant stock option compensation and low supervision not only invest more as also 
invest in a riskier way. Investment will be measured by the ratio CAPEX/Sales, being 
CAPEX the dollar amount spent by firms on the acquisition of fixed assets.  
 
3.1.5 Independent variables 
 
CEO compensation (SOTO) 
CEOs’ stock options compensation will be measured by the dollar amount of stock 
option compensation over total compensation ratio, which is, by simplification, the 
percentage of the CEOs compensation that is paid in stock options. Alternatively, this 
variable will be replaced by a dummy which assumes the value 1 if the firm grants stock 
options to CEO and 0 otherwise. 
 
Profitability (ROA) 
The profitability of firms will be measured by the return on assets. ROA was 
determined dividing EBIT by Total Assets to which cash was subtracted once it is not 
an operating asset. Presumably, firms with higher returns will remunerate shareholders 
better, ceteris paribus, and will invest more. The impact on leverage is more uncertainty 
as, for instance, it will be negative according to the Pecking Order Theory but positive 
according to the Trade-Off Theory. 
 
Size (TA) 
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The logarithm of total assets (in this study expressed in million dollars) is used as a 
proxy for the firm size. 
 
Industry stage (GI) 
To explore differences across growth and stable industries, we created a dummy 
variable, that will assume 1, is the firms belong to a growth industry
2
 and 0 otherwise. 
 
Monitoring (MON) 
Managers with power and no constant supervision tend to be less careful with risky 
investments. Also, managers in this situation tend to avoid distributing dividends even 
when there is excess cash. Therefore, a monitoring variable (measured as shareholders’ 
dispersion) will be included in our models
3
. 
 
Board Meetings (BM) 
This variable can represent CEOs’ supervision. The number of board meetings that 
occur during a fiscal year was included to complement the monitoring variable. It is 
expected that firms with a higher number of annual meetings will reduce the likelihood 
that CEOs will invest negligently and do not distribute dividends. 
 
Risk (RK) 
The risk of the firm will be determined by the annualized volatility of daily returns. Due 
to the characteristics of stock options valuation, this variable is included once the risk 
factor tends to increase the probability of stock options to be in the money. 
 
Taxes (TAX) 
Effective corporate income tax was obtained dividing income taxes by the pre-tax 
income or EBT. A higher corporate income tax usually has an important role in the 
determination of the debt amount of firms due to tax shelter. 
 
                                                          
2
 Industries with potential to grow due to market necessities and demand 
3
 Although this can be a noisy measure, it is the one possible to include due to lack of data about 
institutional investors, who generally have large amounts of stocks and thus have the incentives to make a 
tight control 
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Tobin-Q (TQ) 
Tobin-Q ratio performs a comparison between firms’ market and book values. Although 
exceptions exist, the higher the ratio, the bigger the capacity of firms to add value to 
their balance sheet. Thus, it is expected that, firms with higher Tobin-Q values invest 
more since they (at least in theory) are able to add more value than the remaining firms, 
attracting thus investors more easily. 
 
CEO age (AGE) 
As described in the literature, CEO’s age can influence investment decisions. Although 
with different motivations, younger and older CEOs tend to invest less: the first ones 
due to inexperience and the second ones since their retirement tends to be closer and so 
they may not be much concerned about company’s future. 
 
 
 
3.2 Data and sample 
 
To perform our study data, for the period between 2013 and 2015, from a sample of 498 
listed firms belong to S&P 500 was collected using DataStream database. Stock options 
compensation data for the same period was collected in AFL-CIO (American Federation 
of labour and congress of industrial organizations)
4, firms’ financial statements and in 
salary.com
5
. Due to a large amount of missing data, 158 firms were removed from the 
initial sample. Then, firms have been grouped into sectors according to GICS (Global 
Industry Classification Standards) criteria. From here on, 20 firms were removed for 
belonging to the financial sector (Banks, Insurers, Real Estate Investment Trust and 
other financial services) and 6 other were excluded due to lack of representativeness of 
the sector it belongs: 5 of them represented the “telecommunication” sector and 1 
represented the “utilities” sector. Finally each sector was classified as growth or non-
growth industry according to their R&D intensity as documented by OECD (2011): 
consumer discretionary, health care, industries and IT, classified by OECD as high or 
                                                          
4
 An American association for employees’ rights 
5
 A web source for compensation data 
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medium-high tech industries were considered as growth industries and consumer 
staples, energy and materials, were by their time classified as low or medium-low tech 
industries and for that reason were settled as the non-growth ones in this study. This 
classification follows the previously explained literature reasoning that traditional 
industries do not grant as many stock options as growth industries since they do not 
have many investment opportunities and so CEOs do not need many incentives to invest 
and take risks. At the same time, it allows these firms to have high levels of debt in their 
balance sheet since they are less likely of needing new loans in the future to face 
investment opportunities. Also, because when there are no investment opportunities 
excess cash should be distributed, low amounts of stock options are less likely to 
represent a barrier to dividend distribution. 
 
 
3.3 Descriptive statistics 
 
From the 314 firms’ sample, 230 belong to the growth industries and the remaining 80 
to the non-growth industries. They were later split as small, medium or large according 
to their size. Because US criteria of size classification is a very complex one (depending 
of the number of employees and revenues and varying from sector to sector), we have 
qualified firms as small, medium or large according to the lower, middle or upper third 
of the sector’s total assets annual average of the period under analysis (2013-2015). Our 
sample and sub-samples are presented in Table 2. 
 
Classification Total Small Medium Large
Growth industries 230 78 76 76
73.25% 34% 33% 33%
Non-growth industries 84 30 27 27
26.75% 36% 32% 32%
Total 314 108 103 103
Table 2: Sample distribution according to growth, non-growth industries and size
Industry classification is taken from OECD. Size is determined according to sector's total 
assets annual average.
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Table 3 provides mean and median values of all dependent and independent variables 
for the full sample, growth and non-growth industries, as well as the statistical 
significance of the differences of the two subgroups.  
No big differences were observed between growth and non-growth industries regarding 
CEOs’ stock option compensation. 
In what has to do with shareholders’ remuneration, it is interesting to observe that 
growth industries have lower dividend yields but higher repurchase yields when 
compared to the remaining subgroup. Shareholders dispersion (measured by the 
monitoring variable) evidences a greater concentration of shares in growth industries, 
which can probably be explained by the fact that these firms are usually hold by 
institutional investors and investment funds. It is also interesting to note that growth-
industries’ capital expenditures to sales are almost half of the values evidenced in the 
non-growth subsample. 
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Variable Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Stock option to total 
compensation
% 19.10 16.80 19.55 17.26 18.11 17.71 1.44 -0.45
CEOs' age # 56.80 57 56.57 58 57.53 58 -0.96 0.00
Board meetings # 7.10 7 7.49 7 8.18 8 -0.69** -0.34*
CAPEX / Sales % 9.20 3.80 5.42 3.54 14.95 6.29 -9.53*** -2.75***
Dividend Yield % 1.90 1.70 1.57 1.47 2.30 2.23 -0.73*** -0.76***
Repurchase Yield % 3.50 2.30 4.05 3.75 2.92 3.02 1.13*** 0.73***
Leverage % 30.20 16.80 19.55 17.26 18.11 17.71 1.44 -0.45
Monitoring # 1,853,521 47,312 214,081 49,778 82,525 39,029 131,556*** 10,749**
Monitoring % 0.276 0.014 0.364 0.020 0.036 0.009 0.33 0.011**
Risk % 27.50 25.70 23.55 21.97 22.99 23.21 0.56 -1.24
Return on Assets % 11.5 12.00 14.95 13.62 12.50 10.33 2.45*** 3.29***
Total Assets $ million 28,127 13,099 20,641 10,185 27,859 17,941 -7.218** -7.756***
Efective Corporate tax % 19.80 29.10 25.23 27.68 28.53 30.85 -3.30** -3.17**
Tobin-Q # 3.40 3.60 3.00 12.43 2.12 3.50 0.88** 8.93***
Mean 
diferences
Median 
differences
Table 3: Mean and median values of the variables according to the full sample, growth industries and non-growth industries
This table presents mean values of all the variables included in this study. Values evidenced for the dependent variables (DY, RY, CPX and LV) are the 
average of year 2015 (t) while for the independent variables (Soto, Age, ROA, TA, Mon, BM, Rk, Tax and TQ) they are the average of years 2014 (t-1) 
and 2013 (t-2). Extreme values were treated recurring to winsorize porcess at a 2.5% level, exception is made for the BM and Age variables. Total assets 
are expressed in millions; age is expressed in years; board meetings, Tobin-Q and age are expressed in absolute terms and stock option compensation to 
total compensation, dividend yield, repurchase yield, leverage, capex, return on assets, risk and taxes are expressed in relative terms. Monitoring is 
expressed both in absolute and relative terms. Statistical significance is represented by * at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. 
Full sample Growth industries
Units
Non-Growth industries
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Tables 4 and 5 show the mean and median values for the small, medium and large 
sample of each industry stage respectively, where one must highlight the fact that small 
growth firms’ CEOs stock option compensation is 5 percentage points higher than in 
large firms of the same group. We also observe that large firms tend to repurchase more 
stocks than smaller ones; leverage tend to increase with firm’s size and is lower for 
growth industries (which is likely to be explained by the fact that these firms need to 
keep open the possibility to contract more debt since investment opportunities are more 
frequent) and that shareholders dispersion tend to decrease with size, although 
exception is made for the case of medium size firms of growth industries, where the 
concentration is huge and on average each shareholder has 6,886,024 shares, which is 
almost 0.79% of firm’s total shares outstanding, being much higher than the 0.02% 
presented by medium size firms of the non-growth group. Profitability tends to decrease 
with firm size, contrarily to what was expected at first since large firms tend to be more 
efficient and take advantage from economies of scale. Correlation matrix of the 
variables is provided in appendixes.  
25 
 
Variable Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Stock option to total compensation % 21.25 19.77 20.24 16.31 16.02 13.32
CEOs' age # 56.77 56 56.97 56 56.03 56
Board meetings # 6.56 7 6.47 6 7.51 8
CAPEX / Sales % 4.10 3.20 5.40 3.08 5.69 3.45
Dividend Yield % 1.48 0.74 1.66 1.41 2.13 2.22
Repurchase Yield % 3.86 2.06 3.60 2.53 4.38 3.89
Leverage % 15.31 11.70 28.67 20.32 35.04 22.48
Monitoring # 464,936 75,654 6,886,024 85,376 190,635 36,337
Monitoring % 0.256 0.042 0.782 0.030 0.056 0.004
Risk % 27.24 25.36 27.73 26.64 25.08 24.40
Return on Assets % 18.81 18.18 13.48 11.33 12.36 11.18
Total Assets $ million 5,156 4,955 12,815 11,613 64,470 39,750
Efective Corporate tax % -4.10 29.39 30.99 28.59 25.16 28.17
Tobin-Q # 9.98 4.92 5.68 3.08 5.69 3.32
Table 4: Mean and median values of the variables of growth industries
This table presents mean and median values of all the variables included in this study, for the "growth industries" group. Values 
evidenced for the dependent variables (DY, RY, CPX and LV) are the average of year 2015 (t) while for the independent 
variables (Soto, Age, ROA, TA, Mon, BM, Rk, Tax and TQ) they are the average of years 2014 (t-1) and 2013 (t-2). Extreme 
values were treated recurring to winsorize porcess at a 2.5% level, exception is made for the BM and Age variables. Total 
assets are expressed in millions; age is expressed in years; board meetings, Tobin-Q and age are expressed in absolute terms 
and stock option compensation to total compensation, dividend yield, repurchase yield, leverage, capex, return on assets, risk and 
taxes are expressed in relative terms. Monitoring is expressed both in absolute and relative terms. Statistical significance is 
represented by * at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. 
Units Small Medium Large
Growth industries
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Variable Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Stock option to total compensation % 17.69 17.67 20.61 19.99 18.62 16.47
CEOs' age # 57.73 58 56.63 56 57.67 58
Board meetings # 6.27 6 7.70 8 9.59 7
CAPEX / Sales % 24.52 4.35 18.81 6.13 17.44 6.77
Dividend Yield % 1.60 1.53 2.52 2.23 3.28 2.96
Repurchase Yield % 2.30 1.29 1.64 0.52 2.56 1.83
Leverage % 29.94 17.78 52.62 33.80 42.19 22.34
Monitoring # 154,635 46,808 86,980 38,295 34,334 24,058
Monitoring % 0.077 0.042 0.020 0.008 0.005 0.002
Risk % 29.70 28.16 30.55 29.92 29.12 27.20
Return on Assets % 5.36 13.03 2.14 9.94 -1.38 8.10
Total Assets $ million 7,560 6,930 24,135 23,004 62,132 46,414
Efective Corporate tax % 30.16 32.22 24.40 28.17 26.70 27.33
Tobin-Q # -40.08 3.75 19.08 2.17 4.02 2.44
Large
Table 5: Mean and median values of the variables of non-growth industries
This table presents mean and median values of all the variables included in this study, for the "non-growth industries" group. 
Values evidenced for the dependent variables (DY, RY, CPX and LV) are the average of year 2015 (t) while for the independent 
variables (Soto, Age, ROA, TA, Mon, BM, Rk, Tax and TQ) they are the average of years 2014 (t-1) and 2013 (t-2). Extreme 
values were treated recurring to winsorize porcess at a 2.5% level, exception is made for the BM and Age variables. Total assets 
are expressed in millions; age is expressed in years; board meetings, Tobin-Q and age are expressed in absolute terms and stock 
option compensation to total compensation, dividend yield, repurchase yield, leverage, capex, return on assets, risk and taxes are 
expressed in relative terms. Monitoring is expressed both in absolute and relative terms. Statistical significance is represented by * 
at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. 
Units
Non-Growth industries
Small Medium
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4. Empirical Results 
 
This section provides the empirical results of our analysis regarding the impact of stock 
options granting to CEOs on corporate decisions. 
 
 
4.1 Certification of hypothesis 
 
This empirical study intends to test the following hypotheses: 
 
H1: CEO’ stock option grants decrease firms’ dividend yield 
 
H2: CEO’ stock option grants increase firms’ leverage 
 
H3: CEO’ stock option grants increase firms’ investment expenses 
 
 
4.2 Findings 
 
For each dependent variable (dividend yield, repurchase yield, leverage and investment) 
two regressions are estimated, the first one that uses as proxy for stock option 
compensation, a dummy variable  that assumes the value of 1 if the firm grants CEO’s 
stock options and 0 otherwise. The second regression uses the actual percentage of 
CEO’s compensation that is paid in stock options.  
 
4.2.1 Stock options’ effect on firm’s dividend policy  
 
Tables 6, 7, 8 and 9 report the results regarding the dividend policy, being Tables 6 and 
7 referring to dividends and Tables 8 and 9 to stock buybacks. 
Regarding CEOs’ stock option compensation, (Table 6) we observe that as a dummy 
level it mainly influences medium and large firms. In both cases, this type of 
compensation has a positive impact in non-growth industries’ dividend yield and a 
negative impact in growth industries’ one. Alternatively, when the variable is expressed 
in relative terms (Table 7): for small and medium size firms, we observe a significant 
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linear relation between the percentage of stock options that the firm grants to its CEO 
and the dividend yield. The effect is positive in the case of medium size firms (where a 
10 percentage points change in stock options granted implies a 0.24% change in the 
dividend yield) and negative in small firms (where a 10 percentage points change in 
stock options granted reduces the dividend yield in 0.1%). However, in the last case, 
when the industry stage is considered, this negative effect becomes insignificant for 
non-growth industries, having by its time a significant negative impact of 0.17% in the 
dividend yield of growth industries for each 10-percentage point change in CEOs’ stock 
option compensation. Results also evidence a negative impact of this variable on the 
dividend yield of large firms from growth industries. 
The difference across industries is generally felt across all firms as, when compared 
with non-growth industries, granting stock options to CEOs in growth industries imply a 
reduction on the dividend yield. No quadratic effects were observed in any case. 
However these results are side by side with the literature and confirm that, in some 
cases, the first hypothesis holds: CEOs whose stock option compensation is relevant 
tend to avoid distributing dividends since it reduces the ex-post stock price (exception is 
made for the case where dividends are unexpectedly good that increases the interest of 
investors) – the underlying asset – reducing then the probability of the option to be in-
the-money at the maturity and therefore, reducing CEOs’ wealth. This is particularly 
true in growth industries. 
As expected, ROA and total assets have a positive impact on the dividend distribution 
(although not significant for all the subgroups). On the opposite side, we were expecting 
that the monitoring variables (monitoring and board meetings - that try to measure the 
control over CEOs’ decisions) would increase the dividend yield, however results show 
a negative impact on it. 
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(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Intercept 1.120*** 1.119*** -3.686 1.440*** 1.440*** -1.479 2.235*** 2.234*** 0.756
[0.205] 0.205 [2.595] [0.277] [0.279] [3.731] [0.224] [0.225] [3.279]
Stock option Compensation dummy 0.112 0.611 0.219 0.480 0.942*** 0.519 0.199 0.821** 0.710**
[0.256] [0.469] [0.451] [0.305] [0.348] [0.419] [0.283] [0.334] [0.321]
GI*Soto_dummy -0.683 -0.569 -0.683** -0.636** -0.838*** -0.709**
[0.427] [0.400] [0.318] [0.330] [0.326] [0.303]
Log (Total Assets) 0.735*** 0.503 0.399
[0.273] [0.332] [0.254]
Return on Assets 0.030** 0.061*** 0.023
[0.013] [0.020] [0.021]
Log (Monitoring) -0.112* -0.141 -0.266**
[0.066] [0.049] [0.110]
Board Meetings -0.083 -0.108 -0.033
[0.053] [0.049] [0.050]
R-squared 0.002 0.039 0.151 0.028 0.113 0.236 0.005 0.050 0.206
Adj. R-squared -0.008 0.020 0.101 0.018 0.086 0.189 -0.005 0.032 0.156
F-statistic 0.201 2.110 2.998 2.871 4.212 4.950 0.539 2.656 4.139
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.655 0.126 0.010 0.093 0.008 0.000 0.465 0.075 0.001
Included observations 108 108 108 103 103 103 103 103 103
Table 6: The impact of CEO stock options on firms' dividend policy
Multivariate test
This table reports the estimation of equation 3.1. Stock option compensation is a dummy that equals 1 if the firm grants CEO stock options and 0 
otherwise; dividend yield and ROA are defined in relative terms; total assets are expressed in $ million; monitoring represents the shareholders 
dispersion ratio which is expressed as the average number of shares owned by shareholders and board meetings is the number of meetings that 
occurred annually. GI is a dummy that equals 1 for growing firms and 0 if the firm is in a stable phase. Statistical significance is represented by * at 
10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. Standard deviations are presented in brackets.
Dependent variable: Dividend Yield
Small Medium Large
 
6
 
                                                          
6
 First-order serial correlation has been tested through Durbin-Watson statistic and no significant positive or negative correlation has been found 
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(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Intercept -5.225* -5.208* -4.075 -3.673 -3.422 -0.008 0.321 -0.374 1.101
[2.877] [2.987] [3.051] [3.292] [3.319] [3.417] [3.09] [3.042] [3.099]
Stock option to total compensation (Soto) -0.01* 0.020 0.004 -0.007 0.020 0.024** -0.005 0.017 0.014
[0.005] [0.024] [0.011] [0.006] [0.028] [0.011] [0.009] [0.021] [0.011]
Stock option to total compensation_squared -0.01 -0.001 -0.001
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
GI*Soto -0.017* -0.033*** -0.026**
[0.01] [0.01] [0.011]
Log (Total Assets) 0.882*** 0.823*** 0.763** 0.781*** 0.688** 0.365 0.463* 0.492** 0.375
[0.311] [0.306] [0.321] [0.295] [0.301] [0.317] [0.249] [0.238] [0.249]
Return on Assets 0.037*** 0.035*** 0.033* 0.056*** 0.059*** 0.059*** 0.021 0.022 0.023
[0.013] [0.014] [0.017] [0.021] [0.022] [0.02] [0.02] [0.021] [0.019]
Log (Monitoring) -0.088 -0.053 -0.096 -0.162* -0.130 -0.150** -0.272** -0.249** -0.263**
[0.065] [0.08] [0.06] [0.082] [0.089] [0.082] [0.108] [0.117] [0.105]
Board Meetings -0.080 -0.084 -0.08 -0.098** -0.091* -0.101** -0.028 -0.025 -0.025
[0.057] [0.055] [0.052] [0.050] [0.051] [0.045] [0.056] [0.055] [0.053]
R-squared 0.145 0.165 0.167 0.221 0.231 0.270 0.173 0.183 0.206
Adj. R-squared 0.103 0.116 0.117 0.181 0.183 0.224 0.130 0.132 0.157
F-statistic 3.455 3.329 3.364 5.498 4.798 5.908 4.056 3.578 4.160
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.006 0.005 0.004597 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.001
Included observations 108 108 108 103 103 103 103 103 103
Multivariate test
Table 7: The impact of CEO stock options on firms' dividend policy
Dependent variable: Dividend Yield
Small Medium Large
This table reports the estimation of equation 3.1. Dividend yield, stock option to total compensation and ROA are defined in relative terms; total 
assets are expressed in $ million; monitoring represents the shareholders dispersion ratio which is expressed as the average number of shares 
owned by shareholders and board meetings is the number of meetings that occurred annually. GI is a dummy that equals 1 for growing firms and 0 if 
the firm is in a stable phase. Statistical significance is represented by * at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. Standard deviations are presented in brackets. 
Equation (1) looks to explore a linear relation between soto and the dependent variable while (2) explores a quadratic effect and (3) explores 
differences across G.I. and non-G.I.
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4.2.2 Stock options’ effect on firm’s buyback decisions  
 
Tables 8 and 9 report the estimated results for the same regressions but using the 
repurchase yield as dependent variable (regression 3.2). 
When expressed as a dummy level (Table 8), stock option compensation does not shows 
a significant impact on firms’ stock repurchases. 
Notwithstanding, when measured in relative terms to the total compensation, our results 
change according to the size of the company. In the case of small companies, as higher 
is the percentage of stock compensation granted to the CEO, the lower will be the 
repurchase yield. For medium sizes, this impact is only true for companies that belong 
to a non-growth industry, as the stock compensation granted to CEO of medium growth 
companies has no impact on the repurchase yield. Finally and consistent with previous 
literature (Lambert et al., 1989; Lamba and Miranda, 2010) granting stock options to 
CEOs of large companies from a growth industry increases the repurchase yield (Table 
9): a 10-percentage point change in stock options granted to CEOs increases the 
repurchase yield by 0.38% .The same is not true, however, for large companies from a 
non-growth industry.  
Thus, granting stock options to CEOs of small and medium companies from a non-
growth industry has a negative impact on shares repurchases while remunerate CEOs of 
large companies from a growth industry has the opposite impact. In the case of large 
companies from growth industries, such impact can be related with the hypothesized 
idea of managerial opportunism. The fact that in growth industries’ case, repurchases 
tend to increase with firms’ size is likely to be explained with an easier access to debt, 
which has a lower cost than equity and allows reducing firms’ weighted average cost of 
capital. 
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(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Intercept 3.572*** 3.572*** -3.616 3.679*** 3.679*** 13.076** 3.549*** 3.549*** 8.325
[0.468] [0.470] [6.497] [0.439] [0.441] [5.654] [0.537] [0.540] [5.542]
Stock option Compensation dummy -0.324 -0.115 -0.480 -0.133 -1.143** -0.693 1.262** 0.204 0.477
[0.528] [0.583] [0.590] [0.510] [0.571] [0.728] [0.626] [0.755] [0.796]
GI*Soto_dummy -0.286 -1.177 1.495** 0.802 1.426** 1.044
[0.543] [0.583] [0.640] [0.683] [0.670] [0.674]
Log (Total Assets) 0.613 -0.979* -0.654
[0.713] [0.557] [0.436]
Return on Assets 0.0832** 0.049 0.065
[0.037] [0.054] [0.048]
Log (Monitoring) 0.043 -0.096 0.135
[0.125] [0.164] [0.191]
Board Meetings 0.030 0.038 0.004
[0.123] [0.107] [0.084]
R-squared 0.003 0.005 0.050 0.000 0.044 0.079 0.041 0.067 0.111
Adj. R-squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.009 0.025 0.022 0.032 0.048 0.055
F-statistic 0.364 0.253 0.832 0.049 2.310 1.384 4.344 3.565 1.996
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.548 0.777 0.548 0.825 0.105 0.229 0.040 0.032 0.074
Included observations 108 108 108 103 103 103 103 103 103
Table 8: The impact of CEO stock options on firm's stock repurchases
Dependent variable: Repurchase Yield
Small Medium Large
This table reports the estimation of equation 3.2. Stock option compensation is a dummy that equals 1 if the firm grants CEO stock options and 0 otherwise; 
repurchase yield and ROA are defined in relative terms; total assets are expressed in $ million; monitoring represents the shareholders dispersion ratio 
which is expressed as the average number of shares owned by shareholders and board meetings is the number of meetings that occurred annually. GI is a 
dummy that equals 1 for growing firms and 0 if the firm is in a stable phase. Statistical significance is represented by * at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. 
Multivariate Tests
33 
 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Intercept -3.984 -3.974 -4.865 16.465*** 16.398*** 12.514** 11.102** 10.026* 9.898*
[6.139] [6.815] [6.305] [5.762] [5.922] [5.827] [5.607] [5.284] [5.676]
Stock option to total compensation (Soto) -0.021 -0.003 -0.032** 0.000 -0.007 -0.032* 0.03** 0.064 0.001
[0.015] [0.047] [0.016] [0.015] [0.050] [0.020] [0.017] [0.058] [0.021]
Stock option to total compensation_squared 0.000 0.000 -0.001
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
GI*Soto 0.013 0.036* 0.039*
[0.017] [0.021] [0.023]
Log (Total Assets) 0.600 0.546 0.692 -1.364*** -1.339** -0.915* -0.849** -0.804* -0.714*
[0.682] [0.724] 80.699] [0.523] [0.586] [0.564] [0.430] [0.448] [0.429]
Return on Assets 0.086** 0.085** 0.09** 0.054 0.053 0.050 0.063 0.063 0.060
[0.036] [0.039] [0.038] [0.052] [0.053] [0.053] [0.050] [0.049] [0.052]
Log (Monitoring) 0.082 0.104 0.087 -0.083 -0.092 -0.096 0.106 0.142 0.092
[0.127] [0.146] [0.125] [0.146] [0.149] [0.145] [0.206] [0.203] [0.203]
Board Meetings 0.038 0.036 0.038 0.029 0.028 0.033 -0.014 -0.009 -0.02
[0.120] [0.119] [0.123] [0.108] [0.110] [0.108] [0.084] [0.081] [0.087]
R-squared 0.056 0.058 0.059 0.071 0.071 0.084 0.082 0.086 0.097
Adj. R-squared 0.010 0.002 0.003 0.023 0.013 0.027 0.034 0.029 0.041
F-statistic 1.217 1.035 1.056 1.481 1.225 1.469 1.728 1.512 1.723
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.307 0.407 0.394 0.203 0.300 0.197 0.135 0.182 0.124
Included observations 108 108 108 103 103 103 103 103 103
Table 9: The impact of CEO stock options on firms' stock repurchases
Dependent variable: Repurchase Yield
Small Medium Large
This table reports the estimation of equation 3.2. Repurchase yield, stock option to total compensation and ROA are defined in relative terms; total 
assets are expressed in $ million; monitoring represents the shareholders dispersion ratio which is expressed as the average number of shares owned 
by shareholders and board meetings is the number of meetings that occurred annually. GI is a dummy that equals 1 for growing firms and 0 if the firm is 
in a stable phase. Statistical significance is represented by * at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. Standard deviations are presented in brackets.Equation (1) 
looks to explore a linear relation between soto and the dependent variable while (2) explores a quadratic effect and (3) explores differences across 
G.I. and non-G.I.
Multivariate Tests
34 
 
4.2.3 Stock options’ effect on firm’s leverage  
 
Tables 10 and 11 show the estimation results when leverage (measured by the debt-to-
equity ratio) is the dependent variable (regression 3.3). 
When considering the dummy variable – grant or not grant stock options to the CEO – 
(Table 10), the coefficients associated to the dummy variable are not statistically 
significant. When the stock options granted are measured in relative terms to the total 
compensation (Table 11), it is possible to observe that for small firms from non-growth 
industries a small change of 1 percentage point change in the stock option pay (in the 
total compensation) implies a 0.264% decrease in firm’s leverage ratio. This is likely to 
be explained by the fact that, being these stable firms without many new opportunities, 
CEOs may prefer certain incomes instead of taking extra risks and trying to achieve 
higher payoffs, as it was reported by Gaver and Gaver (1993). 
This way, and although there is an exception for small firms that belong to a non-
growth industry or, in a smaller scale for medium firms that belong to a growth, the 
CEOs’ stock option compensation does not influence much firms’ debt ratios. This may 
be explained by the fact that, contrarily to the dividends’ case, leverage has long-term 
effects that increase firm’s risk and that may end up in firm’s bankruptcy, making not 
only those stock options be worth zero as well as making managers lose their jobs.  
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(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Intercept 0.202*** 0.202*** -1.813*** 0.272*** 0.272*** -0.263 0.292*** 0.292** 0.334
[0.032] [0.033] [0.392] [0.051] [0.051] [0.625] [0.037] [0.037] [0.501]
Stock option Compensation dummy -0.033 0.016 -0.033 0.035 0.119* 0.050 0.056 0.047 0.059
[0.035] [0.068] [0.055] [0.057] [0.063] [0.060] [0.043] [0.059] [0.055]
GI*Soto_dummy -0.066 0.016 -0.124** -0.072 0.012 0.005
[0.073] [0.060] [0.056] [0.048] [0.061] [0.064]
Board Meetings 0.003 0.003 0.012
[0.006] [0.010] [0.009]
Log (Monitoring) 0.001 -0.014 0.026*
[0.009] [0.014] [0.015]
Effective Corporate Taxes -0.101 -0.069 -0.038
[0.114] [0.275] [0.203]
Log (Total Assets) 0.235*** 0.075 -0.038
[0.043] [0.066] [0.044]
R-squared 0.007 0.021 0.278 0.006 0.055 0.085 0.013 0.013 0.078
Adj. R-squared -0.003 0.003 0.235 -0.004 0.036 0.028 0.003 0.000 0.020
F-statistic 0.729 1.143 6.476 0.564 2.925 1.485 1.336 0.677 1.355
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.395 0.323 0.000 0.455 0.058 0.191 0.251 0.511 0.241
Included Observations 108 108 108 103 103 103 103 103 103
Table 10: The impact of CEO stock options on firms' leverage
Multivariate Tests
This table reports the estimation of equation 3.3. Stock option compensation is a dummy that equals 1 if the firm grants CEO stock options and 
0 otherwise; leverage and effective corporate taxes are defined in relative terms; total assets are expressed in $ million; monitoring 
represents the shareholders dispersion ratio which is expressed as the average number of shares owned by shareholders and board meetings 
is the number of meetings that occurred annually. GI is a dummy that equals 1 for growing firms and 0 if the firm is in a stable phase. 
Statistical significance is represented by * at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. Standard deviations are presented in brackets.
Dependent variable: Leverage
Small Medium Large
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(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Intercept -1.707*** -1.704*** -1.761*** -0.548 -0.438 -0.218 0.403 0.513 0.346
[0.401] [0.404] [0.393] [0.605] [0.608] [0.596] [0.478] [0.532] [0.503]
Stock option to total compensation (Soto) -0.154** -0.207 -0.264** -0.095 0.558 0.163 0.159 -0.185 0.039
[0.061] [0.227] [0.106] [0.096] [0.413] [0.152] [0.176] [0.461] [0.172]
Stock option to total compensation_squared 0.111 -1.249* 0.789
[0.463] [0.706] [1.211]
GI*Soto 0.116 -0.285** 0.162
[0.128] [0.146] [0.218]
Board Meetings 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.012 0.012 0.012
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.01] [0.009] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Log (Monitoring) 0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.015 -0.008 -0.015 0.025 0.021 0.024
[0.008] [0.009] [0.008] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016]
Effective Corporate Taxes -0.083 -0.085 -0.069 -0.059 -0.051 -0.073 -0.042 -0.049 -0.033
[0.113] [0.114] [0.117] [0.266] [0.272] [0.266] [0.204] [0.206] [0.209]
Log (Total Assets) 0.224*** 0.224*** 0.229*** 0.107* 0.081 0.071 -0.042 -0.047 -0.036
[0.046] [0.046] [0.044] [0.061] [0.064] [0.06] [0.041] [0.044] [0.044]
R-squared 0.295 0.295 0.299 0.079 0.103 0.093 0.072 0.080 0.076
Adj. R-squared 0.260 0.253 0.257 0.032 0.047 0.036 0.024 0.022 0.019
F-statistic 8.519 7.038 7.174 1.664 1.831 1.632 1.510 1.384 1.322
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.150 0.101 0.147 0.194 0.229 0.255
Included observations 108 108 108 103 103 103 103 103 103
Table 11: The impact of CEO stock options on firms' leverage
Multivariate Tests
This table reports the estimation of equation 3.3. Leverage, stock option to total compensation and effective corporate taxes are defined in relative 
terms; total assets are expressed in $ million; monitoring represents the shareholders dispersion ratio which is expressed as the average number of 
shares owned by shareholders and board meetings is the number of meetings that occurred annually. GI is a dummy that equals 1 for growing firms 
and 0 if the firm is in a stable phase. Statistical significance is represented by * at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. Standard deviations are presented in 
brackets. Equation (1) looks to explore a linear relation between soto and the dependent variable while (2) explores a quadratic effect and (3) 
explores differences across G.I. and non-G.I.
Dependent variable: Leverage
Small Medium Large
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4.2.4 Stock options’ effect on firm’s investment decisions  
 
The output of the regression 3.4, when the dependent variable is firms’ investment, 
measured by the CAPEX/Sales ratio, is presented in Tables 12 and 13.  
Table 12 shows the results when the stock option compensation is treated as a dummy 
variable and we can see that large firms, from a non-growth industry, that grant stock 
options as part of the CEO compensation invest around 0.069% more than the firms do 
not grant (similar results were obtained for medium firms); the impact however is 
negative for large firms of growth industries. 
Alternatively, considering the percentage of stock option in the CEO’s total 
remuneration (Table 13), we do not observe a clear impact in investment decisions. 
There is however an exception for the case of large firms from growth industries where 
a 10-percentage point change in percentage of stock options in CEO’s total 
compensation decreases investment in almost 1 percent. Although significant, this result 
contradicts our expectations that firms that grant more stock options to CEOs invest 
more, but is consistent with Gaver and Gaver (1993)’s suggestion on some CEOs 
preference on certain incomes instead of taking risks to achieve higher stock options’ 
payoffs.  
Regarding stock options’ quadratic effects, no evidence has been proven to exist for any 
of the size subgroups. There is also no relevant evidence about the quadratic effect of 
CEOs’ age (younger and older CEOs invest less than middle age ones) as it was pointed 
by Ryan and Wiggins (2002) and Zona (2016). 
Risk has also been proven to play an important role on firms’ investment decisions once 
our outputs show significant results for the overall firms regardless of the size. 
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(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Intercept 0.101*** 0.101*** -1.437 0.068*** 0.068*** 1.366* 0.089*** 0.089*** -0.506
[0.034] [0.034] [1.811] [0.017] [0.017] [0.821] [0.021] [0.021] [0.525]
Stock option compensation dummy -0.047 -0.017 -0.011 0.019 0.086* 0.063* -0.005 0.068* 0.069*
[0.029] [0.035] [0.020] [0.023] [0.045] [0.037] [0.018] [0.042] [0.040]
GI*Soto_dummy -0.040 -0.007 -0.099** -0.052 -0.100** -0.083*
[0.039] [0.018] [0.046] [0.035] [0.046] [0.044]
Age 0.043** -0.017 -0.007
[0.018] [0.022] [0.012]
Age_squared 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Tobin-Q 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Board Meetings -0.008** 0.002 0.005
[0.004] [0.004] [0.005]
Log (Monitoring) 0.003 0.001 -0.009
[0.004] [0.007] [0.008]
Log (Total Assets) 0.008 -0.118* 0.068*
[0.101] [0.072] [0.038]
Risk 0.634*** 0.317* 0.447**
[0.213] [0.164] [0.187]
R-squared 0.044 0.060 0.432 0.006 0.123 0.246 0.001 0.108 0.231
Adj. R-squared 0.035 0.044 0.379 -0.004 0.105 0.173 -0.009 0.089 0.157
F-statistic 4.921 3.437 8.266 0.616 7.000 3.367 0.065 6.037 3.106
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.029 0.036 0.000 0.434 0.001 0.001 0.799 0.003 0.003
Included Observations 108 108 108 103 103 103 103 103 103
Table 12: The impact of CEO stock options on firms' investment decisions
Multivariate Tests
This table reports the estimation of equation 3.4. Stock option compensation is a dummy that equals 1 if the firm grants CEO stock options and 
0 otherwise; investment and risk are defined in relative terms; total assets are expressed in $ million; CEO age is expressed in years; Tobin-Q is 
the ratio between equity market and book value; monitoring represents the shareholders dispersion ratio which is expressed as the average 
number of shares owned by shareholders and board meetings is the number of meetings that occurred annually. GI is a dummy that equals 1 
for growing firms and 0 if the firm is in a stable phase. Statistical significance is represented by * at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. Standard 
deviations are presented in brackets.
Dependent variable: Investment
Small Medium Large
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(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Intercept -1.372 -1.393 -0.302 1.063 1.230 1.300 -0.835 -0.809 -0.528
[1.149] [1.159] [1.115] [0.905] [0.892] [0.852] [0.583] [0.585] [0.507]
Stock option to total compensation (Soto) -0.045 -0.088 -0.021 0.006 0.254 0.164 -0.022 0.038 0.158
[0.036] [0.096] [0.057] [0.042] [0.214] [0.167] [0.046] [0.202] [0.139]
Stock option to total compensation_squared 0.089 -0.471 -0.137
[0.153] [0.373] [0.395]
GI*Soto -0.032 -0.175 -0.248*
[0.064] [0.162] [0.156]
Age 0.039** 0.039** 0.037** -0.011 -0.012 -0.014 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006
[0.017] [0.017] [0.016] [0.022] [0.022] [0.021] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012]
Age_squared 0.000*** 0.00** 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Tobin-Q 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000** 0.000* 0.000* 0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Board Meetings -0.008** -0.008** -0.008** 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.006 0.006
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
Log (Monitoring) 0.004 0.003 0.003 -0.002 0.000 -0.002 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.007]
Log (Total Assets) 0.010 0.013 0.009 -0.103 -0.122 -0.116 0.097** 0.094** 0.067*
[0.101] [0.103] [0.101] [0.077] [0.076] [0.076] [0.046] [0.046] [0.039]
Risk 0.652*** 0.647*** 0.661*** 0.345** 0.366** 0.327* 0.432** 0.436** 0.433**
[0.215] [0.214] [0.227] [0.170] [0.166] [0.170] [0.195] [0.196] [0.192]
R-squared 0.432 0.433 0.433 0.217 0.229 0.236 0.160 0.161 0.212
Adj. R-squared 0.386 0.380 0.381 0.151 0.155 0.162 0.089 0.080 0.136
F-statistic 9.414 8.301 8.316 3.266 3.077 3.189 2.241 1.988 2.788
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.031 0.049 0.006
Included observations 108 108 108 103 103 103 103 103 103
Table 13: The impact of CEO stock options on firms' investment decisions
Multivariate Tests
This table reports the estimation of equation 3.4. Investment, stock option to total compensation and risk are defined in relative terms; total assets are 
expressed in $ million; CEO age is expressed in years; Tobin-Q is the ratio between equity market and book value; monitoring represents the 
shareholders dispersion ratio which is expressed as the average number of shares owned by shareholders and board meetings is the number of meetings 
that occurred annually. GI is a dummy that equals 1 for growing firms and 0 if the firm is in a stable phase. Statistical significance is represented by * at 
10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. Standard deviations are presented in brackets. Equation (1) looks to explore a linear relation between soto and the 
dependent variable while (2) explores a quadratic effect and (3) explores differences across G.I. and non-G.I.
Dependent variable: Investment
Small Medium Large
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5. Conclusion 
 
The introduction of variable components in management compensation has both 
interesting and complex points of view. In this study, we examine the possibility that 
CEOs’ stock option compensation can originate interests’ misalignment and increase 
managerial opportunism due to the peculiarity of stock options valuation. 
The results provided by our study show that in fact stock option compensation is likely 
to have a role on firms’ dividend policies: for the particular case of growth industries, 
granting stock options to CEOs results in a reduction of the dividend yield, confirming 
the idea of managerial opportunism. The same however was not confirmed for non-
growth firms. 
When considering share buybacks as an alternative measure for shareholders’ 
remuneration, our results suggest that management’ stock options can in fact impact 
their decisions about firms’ stock repurchases: in the growth industry subgroup, stock 
option compensation and repurchases have a positive and significant relation, being this 
effect larger for large firms.  
Regarding leverage, the results suggest that stock option compensation has a negative 
impact on firms’ leverage of both small firms from non-growth industries and medium 
firms from growth-industries. Although unexpected, this results are likely to be 
explained by Gaver and Gaver (1993) suggestion that some CEOs prefer “to play safe” 
and ensure that certain payoffs are ensured, instead of taking risks and trying to achieve 
higher payoffs. Consistent with this idea our results also suggest that, in the case of 
large firms from growth industries, granting stock option to CEOs decreases the 
investment expenses. However, no significant results have been found for the remaining 
firms.  
Our results suffer from the short period of analysis, but accessible data about CEOs’ 
stock option compensation for a longer period was not available. New studies on this 
topic, beside to analysis a larger period can also benefit from using alternative measures 
for investment since capital expenditures excludes the amounts spent on acquisitions. 
Other control variables, such as the percentage of shares owned by institutional 
shareholder should be used as proxy for monitoring since these are usually the ones that 
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perform a closer control over CEOs’ decisions (which in our case was not possible to do 
for the same reasons as the ones pointed for the small period of data analyzed).  
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7. Appendixes 
 
Soto Age BM CPX DY RY LV Mon RK ROA TA Tax TQ
Soto - -0.02 -0.01 -0.10 -0.11 0.00 -0.07 -0.02 -0.04 0.10 -0.09 0.16 -0.09
Age - - -0.03 -0.01 0.10 -0.01 -0.01 -0.08 -0.14 0.10 -0.04 0.12 -0.06
BM - - - 0.14 -0.04 0.00 0.17 -0.04 0.10 -0.20 0.18 -0.13 0.20
CPX - - - - 0.13 -0.20 0.38 -0.01 0.25 -0.27 0.14 0.04 0.15
DY - - - - - 0.04 0.20 -0.29 -0.35 0.02 0.36 0.03 0.35
RY - - - - - - 0.08 0.03 -0.01 0.11 0.00 0.07 0.00
LV - - - - - - - -0.01 0.09 -0.39 0.17 -0.05 0.17
Mon - - - - - - - - 0.31 0.04 -0.17 -0.12 -0.17
Rk - - - - - - - - - -0.13 -0.20 -0.21 -0.19
ROA - - - - - - - - - - -0.26 0.25 -0.27
TA - - - - - - - - - - - -0.09 1.00
Tax - - - - - - - - - - - - -0.09
TQ - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Correlation Matrix
 
